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The reproductive revolution
John MacInnes and Julio Pérez Díaz
Abstract
We suggest that a third revolution alongside the better known economic and
political ones has been vital to the rise of modernity: the reproductive revolution,
comprising a historically unrepeatable shift in the efficiency of human reproduc-
tion which for the first time brought demographic security. As well as highlighting
the contribution of demographic change to the rise of modernity and addressing
the limitations of orthodox theories of the demographic transition, the concept
of the reproductive revolution offers a better way to integrate sociology and
demography. The former has tended to pay insufficient heed to sexual reproduc-
tion, individual mortality and the generational replacement of population, while
the latter has undervalued its own distinctive theoretical contribution, portraying
demographic change as the effect of causes lying elsewhere. We outline a theory
of the reproductive revolution, review some relevant supporting empirical evi-
dence and briefly discuss its implications both for demographic transition theory
itself, and for a range of key social changes that we suggest it made possible: the
decline of patriarchy and feminisation of the public sphere, the deregulation and
privatisation of sexuality, family change, the rise of identity, ‘low’ fertility and
‘population ageing’.
Introduction: Kingsley Davis and reproductive institutions
There shall be no more thence an infant of days, nor an old man that hath
not filled his days: for the child shall die an hundred years old.
Isaiah 65:20
Seventy years ago, The Sociological Review published an iconoclastic article
by the young Kingsley Davis arguing that low and falling fertility rates in
Western societies demonstrated that ‘industrialism’ was undermining the
family and threatening population reproduction. In mobile, rationalised,
society the family risked extinction because only the joint involvement of its
members in a heterogeneous range of social functions had previously provided
the basis for kinship bonds strong enough to regulate sexual activity. Under
‘familism’ fertility had been kept high because children were the foundation of
the family ‘and if one does not fit into the family organisation one does not fit
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into society’. However, modernity facilitated ‘unconventionalised intimacies’
and reduced marriage to ‘an amorous adventure’ causing the collapse of
fertility: ‘in a mobile society children are, at any level, a hindrance to social
climbing . . . As our mobile society, with its doctrine of equal opportunity and
its adulation of the self made man, continues to nullify the inheritance of
status, it continues to kill the family’. He suggested that in the future fertility
could only be sustained by ‘a system in which the father’s role is assumed by
the state and the mother’s role by professional women paid by the state for
their services’ (1937: 295, 296, 297, 301, 304).
Davis thus married pessimism about the future of fertility and the family
with precocious insights into social change, anticipating more recent analyses
of ‘plastic sexuality’, ‘pure relationships’ (Giddens, 1992) and women ‘marry-
ing’ the state by over half a century. However the unanticipated ‘baby boom’
which was starting even as he wrote, refocused demographers’ attention on
high fertility and population growth in the developing world rather than low or
falling fertility in industrialised countries. Davis revised his earlier ideas
(which had been echoed by Landry in France (1934),Myrdal in Sweden (1968)
and Charles in Britain (1934)) and along with Princeton colleagues (Davis,
1945; Kirk, 1944; Notestein, 1945, 1953) developed what became demographic
transition theory. This much more optimistic theory proposed that moderni-
sation caused falls first in mortality and then fertility which established a new
demographic equilibrium around low levels of both.The cold war, and the fear
that excessive third world population growth might make Communism an
attractive political option, turned demographic transition theory into a high
profile, politically expedient and well funded orthodoxy (Hodgson, 1983, 1988)
in which the focus was on how to reduce fertility in the developing world
rather than worry about its fall.
As a result Davis’s early ideas about the interconnection between repro-
ductive institutions, fertility, gender and family change faded from view.On the
contrary, Parsons’ (1956) seminal article on the nuclear family (with a caustic
aside about alarmist predictions of ‘race suicide’ which might well have had
Davis in mind) argued that it could function both as a socialiser of gender
identities and a reproducer of population because (in contrast to the public
sphere) it continued to be founded on status ascription by sex.When the end
of the baby boom again brought low, or ‘below-replacement’ fertility to
Europe in the 1970s, demographic theory focused on changes in values (indi-
vidualism, self realisation) and innovation in contraceptive technology (the
pill) to postulate the existence of a ‘second’ demographic transition (Van de
Kaa, 1987, 1990, 2002; Lesthaeghe, 1995). However, despite its academic and
policy hegemony, both classic and second demographic transition theories
always struggled to fit the empirical detail of evidence produced by demo-
graphic and historical research (Cleland andWilson, 1987; Szreter, 1993, 1996;
Robinson, 1997; Cliquet, 1991; Coleman, 2003).As Cleland (2001) argues pre-
transition societies were characterised by a heterogeneous range of reproduc-
tive regimes that sustained fertility which was high enough to balance low life
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expectancies; when mortality falls so too, eventually, does fertility but the
mechanisms and timing of such change still lie beyond any existing theory.
Because demographic theory evolved in this way, focusing on the causes
of fertility decline; and because it prioritised the search for a quantitative,
cross-sectional, statistical correlation between fertility, mortality and other
variables using period measures which are often poor at capturing social
change (MacInnes and Pérez Díaz, 2009), we believe it has tended to overlook
much of the significance and consequences of the truly profound historical
change it was studying.Meanwhile post-war sociology lost its previous interest
in declining fertility and no longer sought to connect this with the changes in
family and gender relations to which it turned its attention, mostly in a debate
with Parsons’ theory.
As a result the significance of a vital process in the rise of modern society,
that is the revolution in the efficiency with which mortal human beings replace
themselves, which we call the reproductive revolution, has been unduly
neglected and poorly understood. It ought to rank alongside the political and
industrial revolutions that ushered in modernity, transforming society and
economy, creating the modern state and consolidating the rise of individualism
(Hobsbawm, 1962).We thus outline here a theory of the reproductive revolu-
tion that might allow us to integrate what are empirically well established
developments in mortality, fertility, the family and gender relations in a more
coherent way than that offered by existing theories of the first and second
demographic transitions.
The reproductive revolution
Although sociologists and demographers often treat population as if it were
a stock, it is a flow based on the generational reproduction of its members.
Let us consider a closed population (that is one not subject to migration). A
population flow is a system with inputs that sustain it over time, in contrast to
the limited duration of its components – individual human lives – and a level
of efficiency that determines the necessary volume of such input (Bertalanffy,
1950). Henry (1965) demonstrated that the years of life lived by a cohort of
births, or mean cohort life expectancy, measures the efficiency of a population
system, since longer lives mean that a proportionately lower birth rate will be
needed to sustain any given volume of population. Population reproduction
is thus a balance between two analytically separable components which are
nevertheless inextricably connected in the real world: births, or fertility, and
deaths, or mortality. If reproductive efficiency is low, short mean lifespans
mean that population can be maintained only by a high volume of births. If
it is high, a lower rate of births suffices. Although this might appear to be a
statement of the obvious, in practice, demographic analysis of reproduction
has tended to concentrate on fertility, at the expense of mortality, for political,
theoretical and technical reasons that we need not go into here.
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There is a second element which must be taken into account, and which
gives the revolutionary change from low to high efficiency its particular form.
Births occur only to women in their fertile years (conventionally taken as ages
15 to 44 or 49). As far as population replacement is concerned, the years of
life of women who die before completing their fertile years are wasted. Thus
while this proportion is decreasing, the efficiency of the system is increased not
only by the overall increase in mean life expectancy but also by the fall in
such wastage. The historical period in which this occurs thus produces a rapid
increase in efficiency that can never be repeated. This is the essence of the
reproductive revolution.
There is an additional, but analytically distinct, component of the repro-
ductive revolution: the relationship between the years of life attained by
each birth and the work, reproductive effort or ‘investment’ dedicated to it.
We do not address this second component here, except to note that the
extension of the division of labour and technnological progress has also
raised the productivity of such work, and that by decreasing the volume of
births necessary for population reproduction, the reproductive revolution
made possible increases in the volume of such work associated with any
individual birth.
The progress of the reproductive revolution thus resembles a logistic curve.
The fertility potential of humans is high. Some groups have reached averages
as high as nine or ten live births per woman. While mortality was high and
erratic, this potential had to be fairly fully employed simply to maintain the
volume of population flow because reproductive efficiency was low. Up until
the seventeenth century, in what Omran (1971: 512) called the age of pesti-
lence and famine ‘life expectancy was short and human misery was assured’.
Data is scanty and requires painstaking effort to reconstruct, but it appears
that crude mortality rates oscillated erratically with epidemics, famine or
warfare between a range of around 20 to 50 per 1,000 (but with occasional
much higher peaks) while mean life expectancy at birth ranged from around
twenty to the low thirties (Omran, 1971; Coale, 1986; Livi Bacci, 2001). Cowgill
(1970) estimated that as few as one in ten girls born in seventeenth century
York survived to reach their fertile years.
Despite the great variability in family size that characterised the past
(alongisde those who had very large families were those with few or no
children) it is clear that the majority of women passed most of their brief adult
lives pregnant, breastfeeding or rearing dependent children. Only those for-
tunate enough both to live long lives and have sufficient power, resources or
status to delegate their reproducive work to others could escape this fate. As
the most important social ‘means of production’, women’s bodies, as well, of
course, as the women inhabiting them, were universally subject to intense but
variable forms of social control (Gil Calvo, 1991; Meillassoux, 1981; Rubin,
1977). It thus seems plausible to attribute the universal but socially variable
nature of patriarchy, which systematically restricted alternatives to mother-
hood for women, to low reproductive efficiency.
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Because our interest is in the survival to different ages of successive gen-
erations we need cohort based mortality data describing the susequent mor-
tality across time of those born in the same historical period (eg a calendar
year), as opposed to period data describing those dying at the same point in
time, regardless of when they were born. Unfortunately such data is available
for only a handful of countries for periods near the start of the reproductive
revolution. Table 1 shows such data for female cohorts born before 1850. For
all these countries and periods, between and third and a half of all women died
before entering their fertile years.A further tenth to one quarter of the orginal
cohort died by the time they reached the end of those years.Within this time
surviving women would very likely see one or more of their several children
predecease them, while they could have little confidence that either they
or their husbands would themselves survive to see their children reach
adulthood. Thus, at the start of the reproductive revolution lives were short,
and from a ‘reproductive’ point of view, a half or more of all births were
wasted.
The reproductive revolution occurred as falls in mortality both increased
the proportion of women surviving into their fertile years (and throughout
these years) and raised the life expectany associated with each birth. For
cohorts of women born in 1870, almost two thirds were surviving to the end of
their fertile years in Sweden and England and Wales, while the mean life
expectancy of their children was already approaching 60 years. In Spain,
however, the equivalent figure was barely one third, with mean life expectancy
below 40. Figure 1 shows the progress for cohorts born in 1900, for countries
where we have located cohort mortality data. By 1930, in the midst of their
childbearing years, between four fifths (Denmark) and two thirds (Italy) were
still alive, their children could on average expect to live seventy years or more.
Parents faced much lower risks of their children predeceasing them.
Within this process, fertility rates can fall dramatically, while the population
grows rapidly. Because the revolution occurred relatively late and rapidly
there, Spain shows its empirical progress unusually clearly, and it may thus be
Table 1 Female birth cohorts’ survival to childbearing ages
Percentage surviving to
age . . .
Early Cohorts 1870 Cohorts
15 45 15 45
Sweden (1751) 61.4 44.3 75.4 62.9
France (1806) 55.0 38.3 60.7 49.9
Denmark (1835) 70.1 53.0 73.2 62.3
Iceland (1838) 69.9 55.3 76.0 64.1
Eng and Wales (1841) 63.8 46.9 66.1 52.7
Sources: Vallin and Meslé n.d. (France) Human Mortality Database n.d. (Other countries).
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no accident that it was here that the origins of the idea of a reproductive
revolution first developed (Pérez Díaz and MacInnes, 2008). The speed and
historical compression of modernisation produced a particular constellation of
generations with contrasting historical experiences living side by side, rather
like a mass of geological strata concentrated in a small space. Spanish women
born in the 1870s had an average of four and a half children each. Their
counterparts fifty years later had two and a half. This decline was enough to
push the net reproduction rate (the mean number of daughters born to women
surviving to their fertile age) below one. However the gains in life expectancy
of the children they produced meant that the rate of reproduction of years of
life never fell below 1.2 and for most of this period was above 1.4 (Cabré, 1999;
Pérez Díaz, 2003b).
For comparison, Figure 1 also shows the projected mortality of women born
one century later in the US. In almost all affluent states, less than one per cent
of women born today will die before reaching their childbearing years, and
barely more than that in the course of those years themselves. Life expectancy
at birth is above 80 and rising by about 1.5 years each decade (Bongaarts,
2007). Depending on whether we assume longevity to have a set biological
limit or not (Olshansky, Carnes and Cassel, 1990; Wilmoth, 1997; Wilmoth
et al., 1999, 2000) the logistic curve of reproductive efficiency either levels off,
or continues at a much gentler rise. The increase in efficiency falls off steeply




















Figure 1 Survival curves female birth cohort 1900
Source: Bell and Miller (2005) (USA); Vallin and Meslé (nd) (France);
Human Mortality Database (nd) (Other Countries).
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years, since it now depends only on increases in years of life per birth, rather
than on the combined effect of this and reductions in female mortality prior to
menopause.
Once the reproductive revolution is complete, virtually all live long
enough not only to become parents themselves, but also to enjoy a long and
active life after that, not only seeing their children become independent but
seeing them having children (and even grandchildren) themselves. In the UK
in the year 2000, six out of ten babies born had all four grandparents known
to be alive when they were born, while a mere two per cent had only one or
no surviving grandparent1. The revolution unleashes an unprecedented era of
demographic security: the liberation of human beings both from the grave
risk of early death and from the burden of reproductive work that was its
inevitable corrolary. In broad terms the reproductive revolution more than
halved the mean number children each woman needed to bear to maintain
the population (from around five or six to around two) while it more than
doubled the lifespans within which they and their partners might perform
this task.
Because it is the mass survival of women to the end of their fertile years that
causes the reproductive revolution, it is an unrepeatable historical event. Its
proximate causes lie in social and economic progress that facilitated such mass
survival. However the dynamic of the revolution itself is demographic, deter-
mined by the empirical characteristics of the biology of the sexual genesis and
mortality of human beings.The reproductive revolution, like its economic and
political counterparts, developed unevenly and in very different ways.We can
gain an indication of this by comparing the year in which cohorts of women
first arrived at the very end of their childbearing years (50) with a majority of
their original members alive.This occurred as early as 1868 in Sweden, around
1880 in Denmark, 1891 in Canada, 1897 in England and Wales, 1909 in the
Netherlands and 1910 in France, but not until 1936 in Italy and 1953 in Spain.
It progressed gradually in Sweden and France, and rapidly in Spain. The
impact of imperialism and colonialism, the geopolitics of population policy
and the potential to transfer such things as medical or public health knowledge
or contraceptive technology across state frontiers, has meant that the experi-
ence of those states that pioneered the revolution could not simply be
repeated in those that followed.
The reproductive revolution and fertility decline
If we accept the reproductive revolution as a hypothesis, it comes to appear as
the origin of a substantial range of social change, which both facilitated its
companion revolutions and formed a vital material substrate to modern
society.
Efficient reproduction enabled fertility to fall and thus liberated resources
for production. The substantial proportion of short and precarious lives
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devoured by the need to recreate life itself became a much smaller part of
longer, more secure lives.We can analyse reproduction as a fourth (or rather,
first) sector of the economy, analogous to agriculture, industry and services.
Just as in the case of agriculture and industry, rising productivity shrunk the
workforce and enabled its expulsion to other sectors in the form of people
dedicating relatively much less time to reproduction across their life course.
This shift became visible as the plummeting fertility rates which so worried
Davis, his fellow demographers and states (Teitelbaum andWinter, 1985) prior
to the ‘baby boom’, since they thought, quite wrongly, that they must lead to
population decline. There is no causal link between reproductive efficiency
and fertility decline, but history has yet to provide any example of a state
where such efficiency gains, once established, have been devoted to multiply-
ing collective reproductive power rather than diminishing the proportion of
effort dedicated to reproduction.
This can be shown by examining the cross-state correlation of mortality and
fertility. Unfortunately we must rely on a period measure, the total fertility
rate (TFR) which represents the fertility for a hypothetical group of women,
unaffected by mortality, that experience the age-specific fertility rates for a
given point in time as if these were the characteristics of a cohort of women
across a life course. However the distortion this introduces can safely be
ignored for our present purposes. If we define ‘high’ fertility as a TFR above
3.8 (the peak reached in the USA in its post-war baby boom 50 years ago) and
take ‘lowmortality’ as life expectancy at birth of 69 or more (its level in the US
at that time) we find states with low mortality but high fertility accounting for
under one percent of the world’s population: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the
West Bank and Gaza, and perhaps more surprisingly (and on the borderline)
Paraguay.2 In all these states fertility is falling: in the case of Saudia Arabia by
some 40% over the last two decades.
The reproductive revolution and the ‘cost’ of children
Demographic transition and household economics theories have generally
concluded that economic progress, the rise of the market and decline of
household based subsistence economies increase the costs of children and thus
help explain falling fertility, despite the difficulty of squaring this with empiri-
cal evidence (Robinson, 1997; Cleland and Wilson, 1987). Caldwell (1982)
emphasized a reversal in the intergenerational flow of wealth. Becker (1991)
highlighted the increasing opportunity costs of children, and that of invest-
ment in their ‘quality’. Myrdal (1968), Landry (1934) and Davis (1937) all
suggested that the state needed to socialise the costs of children since popu-
lation reproduction was a public good that was now borne as a private
expense. Titmuss saw the declining birth rate as a ‘parents’ revolt’ in ‘acquisi-
tive societies’ (1942).As women’s employment expanded across the twentieth
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century, the relationship between fertility and women’s employment moved to
the centre of this debate about the costs of children, driving European states
anxious to reinforce both fertility and mothers’ employment rates to discover
a new interest in work-life balance policies (MacInnes, 2006a). Yet even the
earliest versions of this argument, well illustrated by Davis’s 1937 article, were
haunted by a paradox.How could the cost of children be driving down fertility
if the most palpable and obvious result of economic progress was rising living
standards and it was usually the most affluent who were the first to restrict the
size of their families?
Most attempts to square this analytical circle focused on the ‘opportunity’
rather than direct costs of children. The value of the time spent bearing and
rearing them must increase with the general level of affluence, representing
both men’s and women’s current or future earning opportunities and time
consuming leisure activity foregone.However general economic development,
by multiplying opportunities,must by definition increase the ‘opportunity cost’
of all time consuming activity (Becker, 1965; Linder, 1970). Having children
may require foregoing ever expanding leisure opportunities, but no more so
than enjoying leisure opportunities requires foregoing ever expanding oppor-
tunities to have children!
On the contrary, an analysis based on the reproductive revolution suggests
that the social cost of fertility must have fallen. Indeed, since pregnancy and
childbirth provide a classic example of what Baumol (1967) defined as a
‘technologically non-progressive activity’ – one in which labour productivity
cannot be increased by technological innovation – the dramatic fall in this cost,
driven by the approximate trebling of longevity and consequent fall in fertility,
represented a substantial, unprecedented (and unrepeatable) gain.
The resolution of this paradox requires recalling the analytical distinction
we made above between the cost of population reproduction in terms of the
years of life attained by each birth and the work or reproductive effort dedi-
cated to each birth, broadly analagous to that made by Becker (1991)
between the quantity and qaulity of children. Only because the costs of the
former fell was it at all possible to even countenance a rise in the costs of the
latter. Similarly, only because the reproductive revolution allowed fertility to
fall was it possible for women’s employment to expand in the way in which
it did. That is to say, what have often come to be analysed as the causes of
falling fertility were rather one of its many consequences. Greater resources
could be dedicated to each child only because they were fewer, and longer
lasting. People in societies that have gone through the reproductive revolu-
tion do not have fewer children because they can no longer afford them. On
the contrary, they have fewer children because, for the first time in human
history, they, together with the societies they inhabit, can afford not to.
Indeed, perhaps the most fundamental consequence of the drastic fall in the
cost of fertility was that it enabled the systematic denial of alternative oppor-
tunities to motherhood for women to be overthrown. The reproductive revo-
lution made the defeat of patriarchy possible.
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The collapse of patriarchy
The reproductive revolution has eroded the material base of patriarchy by
lessening the importance within people’s lives of the ineluctably biological
division of labour in sexual reproduction, thus paving the way for the femini-
sation of the public sphere and creating the material context for successful
feminist struggle. The idea of equality between men and women has existed
for millennia. Liberalism, or discourses of human ‘natural’ rights, have been
defenceless against feminism (Mann, 1994). Once it is admitted that natural
differences between men are irrelevant to their moral equality, it is difficult to
argue that such differences (of sex) between men and women are relevant,
although Parsons’ 1956 essay on the family, reproduction and gender identities
could be seen as a spectacular but doomed attempt to do just that.
However the potential for the practical realization of greater sexual equal-
ity has only been released by the reproductive revolution, together with the
evolution of the potentially sex-blind markets, bureaucracies and polities, and
shift of production from the household towards the public sphere that this
revolution had itself helped to create. Within this altered scenario, the influ-
ence of the core biological division of labour is reduced, both because fertility
levels fall, and because technological innovation and the widening division of
labour in reproduction weakens the link between sex and such work.This core
feminizing logic within modernity ultimately leads to contemporary seismic
shifts in what is commonly termed gender relations (Connell, 2002) but which
we prefer to think of as social relations between the sexes (MacInnes, 1998).
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the reproductive revolution has been to
liberate women by dint of reducing the relative scarcity of their reproductive
labour.
Ideology may still portray women as ‘naturally’ more suited than men to
infant care but this division of labour is no longer biologically imposed and is
rapidly being socially redrawn.Thus as well as mounting evidence of a slow but
substantial increase in the proportion of reproductive work done by men
(Gershuny, 1992), there is overwhelming contemporary support, on the part of
both men and women, for greater change. In separate surveys conducted
between 2002 and 2004 in Europe and North America, over nine out of ten
women and men agreed not only that ‘men should do more childcare’ but also
that they ‘should take as much responsibility as women for home and chil-
dren’. Moreover such views were shared by the (shrinking) proportion of
respondents who still believed that women were ‘naturally’ better at such
tasks3. Paradoxically, while second wave feminist thought has often focused
on plastic sexuality and its symbolism, the roots of gender change lie in the
shrinking significance of its reproductive component. This accounts for what
Castells (1997) calls ‘the end of partiarchalism’ although we disagree with the
theoretical model which he uses (MacInnes, 2006b) and which crucially, for us,
lacks a demographic base.
The reproductive revolution
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The privatisation of sexuality
Because it made population replacement so much easier, the third result of the
reproductive revolution was that it facilitated the transformation of reproduc-
tive sexuality from a public to a private affair, re-defining sexuality as a private
matter over which the individual ought to be sovereign. Hitherto sexuality
had always been subject to intense forms of social control at both the level
of society (both normatively and by the state and church) and at the level of
the family. Virtually all known societies segregated the sexes in various ways,
distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate offspring and regulated
sexuality, both through marriage and the prohibition or penalization of extra-
marital sexual relations, non-reproductive forms of sexual activity or contra-
ception and abortion. The expression of sexuality was gradually disconnected
from reproduction, and, in Davis’s terms, intimacy liberated from ‘convention’:
but rather than causing fertility decline by obliterating society’s established
reproductive institutions, it was the former that rendered the transforma-
tion of the latter possible. Official warnings about the dire medical and
moral consequences of abortion, contraception, family limitation or neo-
Malthusianism, backed by the force of law, gave way in little more than half a
century to campaigns about ‘safe sex’.
The mechanisms of social change here are complex. Most legal reform
around abortion, contraception, divorce, marriage and family law took place
within a discourse of gender and equal rights rather than any direct concern
with reproduction or fertility. But it was surely only the prior victory of the
reproductive revolution (together with the ‘baby boom’) that forcibly
removed this latter from the political agenda. One need only contrast the
hysterical political debate and hostility to all manifestations of ‘the woman
question’ aroused by fear of population decline and its consequences in the
first half of the twentieth century in Europe, to the swift and complete victory
of second wave feminism in the second half. In a few short decades, the future
became female. Spain is an instructive example. Thirty years ago, married
women still required their husbands’ permission to take employment, obtain a
passport or open a bank account. Homosexuality, divorce, contraception and
abortion were all illegal. Today, not only are the latter all legal, but same and
different sex couples may marry on an equal basis.
Many of these developments have been analysed in terms of a ‘second
demographic transition’ (Cliquet, 1991; Coleman, 2003; Lesthaeghe, 1995; Van
de Kaa, 1990, 2002), in which changing norms in the context of greater material
affluence and personal autonomy play a key part in the explanation. But, once
again, this is to turn things on their head and pay insufficient attention to what
made the rise of such new norms and lifestyles possible in the first place. In
particular, the collapse of the public regulation of reproductive sexuality and
the edifice of patriarchal insitutions and norms that supported it, tend to be
perceived as the rise of ‘selfishness’.
John MacInnes and Julio Pérez Díaz
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It is often difficult to read the contemporary demographic literature on
fertility and social change without gaining an impression of scientific thought
struggling to free itself from a profoundly conservative and anachronistic
moral worldview. Men’s, and above all, women’s historically unprecedented
freedom to choose whether and when to have children, and within whatever
family form, liberated from the moral strictures of church or state regulation
of the family and reproductive sexuality, always tends to appear wrapped in
swathes of hedonism. If procreation ceases to be a duty, surely the ultimate
foundation of social order is fatally threatened. In the long term population
must surely decline, in the short term, it might be sustained only by recourse
to what may often be seen as a hardly lesser moral threat: large scale
immigration.
However this privatisation of reproductive sexuality, and its liberation from
the control of reproductive institutions (be they state, church or patriarchal
household) has had as its counterpart the inexorable acceptance, for the most
part willing, of an unprecedented but largely invisible (at least to some demog-
raphers) altruism by parents. As sovereign citizens, competitors in a labour
market and authors of their own identities and life courses, it is expressly
understood that children owe their parents nothing. The decline of patriarchy
cuts both ways: parenthood may be freely chosen, but the children thus born
are free, emancipated to pursue their own lives and individual happinesses.
Moreover, in contrast to the hedonism of many of the accounts of what
intimacy liberated from ‘convention’ comprises, in which children appear only
as an ‘inertial drag’ on the purity of a relationship (Giddens, 1992), we know
two things. People have ever higher aspirations both for their children and for
the conditions necessary to rear them adequately, and overwhelming majori-
ties consistently tell social researchers that the family is not only the most
important social institution in their lives, but that which affords them most
satisfaction.
The forward march of the family
The substitution of the state for the family as the institution which serves as
the ultimate guarantor of subsistence and the family’s replacement by the
labour market as the main institution governing production weakens the
family from outside, while inside it is undermined by the increase in the force
of liberalism and personal autonomy (de Singly, 1993; Flaquer, 1998). People’s
status as citizen progressively supplants their status as family member (Mann,
1994).The privatisation of both reproductive and plastic sexuality, the atrophy
of gender and reproductive technological innovation may all mean that ‘fami-
lies’ become increasingly diverse. Davis assumed they must weaken it: ‘sex’
was only good for holding ‘pairs’ together. His comments on women marrying
the state might also be seen to presage the family’s move towards the centre of
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politics, both as an object of population policies and as the institution charged
with realising the rapidly expanding social rights of the infant.
However the final, paradoxical, result of the reproductive revolution is that,
in complete contrast to Davis’ prediction, the family becomes stronger in two
specific but important senses. The democratisation of longevity and mass
maturity leads to the survival at any point in time of more generations within
each family. While children may have fewer siblings they have more grand-
parents. For the first time in history, families comprise mostly the flesh and
blood living rather than the fondly remembered and mourned. Second,
because reproductive work falls as a proportion of all social effort, labour
input per birth can rise. This ranges from the ‘invention of childhood’ (Ariès,
1973) to what could be called the ‘romance’ of the family in contemporary
accounts (eg Lasch, 1977) analogous to the romance of craftism (eg Braver-
man, 1974) in the analysis of other forms of labour.While the family is imag-
ined to be hollowed out, deskilled or degraded by the twin forces of sate and
market, in practice such rhetoric is testimony not only to its increasing signifi-
cance and power, but also to the unprecedented demands placed upon what it
ought to achieve (Donzelot, 1979).Rising rates of cohabitation, separation and
divorce may be evidence of the search for a better family, not the rejection of
the family as such. It is not the family that industrialism suffocates, but rather
its patriarchal form.
While conservatives might follow Davis’ prognosis in decrying the decline
of the family (Fukuyama, 1999) or lament that it has become a mere ‘lifestyle
choice’ (Morgan, 1995), attribute declining fertility rates to selfish hedonism
(Aries, 1980) or the shirking of collective obligations (Myrdal, 1968), diverse
families and low fertility constitute really vital (in every sense) progress.
Family diversity is limited by, and the strength of family obligations main-
tained by, the power of attachment (Bowlby, 1971; Winnicott, 1965) rooted in
the prolonged period of intense neonatal care by adults that infants require
until they become reasonably capable of maintaining social relations autono-
mously (Dinnerstein, 1987). Such care depends heavily upon the long term and
stable presence of a small number of individuals, usually the biological parents
or close relatives of the infant but not necessarily so. This explains both the
universal existence of the family (eg Elshtain, 1982; Goode, 1964), and its
wildly heterogeneous social form, as well as serving the analytical function of
dividing off a private from a public sphere (MacInnes, 1998).
Diverse families will retain as their distinguishing feature the attempt to
maintain stable relations of attachment over time between at least one adult
and an infant, and the later legacy of these relations in terms of feelings of love,
mutual loyalty and obligation, or indeed, resentment, hostility and alienation.
Reproduction can only with great difficulty be ‘industrialised’, ‘commoditised’,
bureaucratised or otherwise rationalised and undertaken in other social insti-
tutions.When this does happen, the results are usually extremely negative (eg
the experience of those raised in orphanages or children’s homes). Davis’
comments on the ‘professionalisation’ of mothering can be seen as a provo-
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cation rather than a prediction. Of course this does not mean that families
always perform reproductive work well, or that they are not, sometimes, the
site of neglect, abuse, violence or murder of children (Dobash and Dobash,
1992; Kelly and Radford, 1987).
Because sexual reproduction requires the family, but renders its individual
components mortal, the family has been the key institution regulating trans-
mission of such individual property as exists. Hence most societies have until
now sought to define and regulate legitimacy (Malinowski, 1927; Morgan,
1995). In nineteenth century Britain this could take the form of defining
illegitimate sexual relations (that might result in the birth of a child and
potential inheritor) as a crime equivalent to theft of property because it put
the inheritance of legitimate heirs at risk (Pateman, 1988). Because the repro-
ductive revolution increases the supply of reproductive labour, reduces the
demand for it and encourages states to socialise its costs, and along with its
sister revolutions undermines the political power of the family in relation to
the state, it follows that legitimacy rapidly becomes less important for social
status.
From gender to generation
As the reproductive revolution allowed fertility to fall in the most developed
states, births first of all became concentrated in the years just after marriage,
and later, once family sizes around two become the norm, became ‘delayed’
occuring later in women’s life courses (Frejka y Calot, 2001). It now looks as
if this revolution is being complemented by a new phase in which reproductive
work not only occurs later within women’s life courses, but also across gen-
erations, becoming less concentrated in time across longer lives. The UK mil-
lennium cohort study, for example, found that although only one in twenty
babies born in 2000 shared a household with a grandparent, one half of those
with working mothers were looked after by grandparents while their mothers
were at work, and three out of four were cared for by grandparents at other
times. Nor was childcare the only means of grandparental support. One third
of mothers and a similar proportion of fathers reported receiving essential
material or financial help from their own parents (loans, money or physical
capital gifts, domestic equipment, help with housing etc.) in addition to gifts or
extras for the baby.4 All this was possible because no less than six out of ten
babies were born with all four grandparents alive.
Elsewhere we have referred to this redistribution of reproductive work
across both the life course and the two sexes as the ‘feminisation of old age’
(Pérez Díaz, 2003a). However what this redistribution really demonstrates
is that what was previously a vital and biologically rooted link between re-
productive work, age and sex has been dramatically weakened. The weight
of reproduction in the social construction of such characteristics is falling,
not because biology or sexuality are merely social constructs (Kessler and
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McKenna, 1978; Bock, 1989) but because high reproductive efficiency and
low fertility has reduced the relevance of the specifically biological division of
labour within sexual reproduction. It is falling not only because there are
fewer births but because of the rapid rise in life expectancy, which has gen-
eralised the simultaneous survival of three generations, so that for the first
time in human history, virtually all infants are not only children but grand
children. And it is not only grandmothers who have taken on reproductive
work, but grandfathers too.As men live longer after retiring earlier, they take
on a growing share of reproductive work that was formerly exclusively done
by women. Hank and Buber (2007) found that 58% of grandmothers and
49% of grandfathers had undertaken some kind of childcare over the previous
year, with over half doing so at least weekly in the ten European countries
they studied.
Population ‘ageing’ or mass maturity
It is well known that demographic systems with low life expectancy and high
fertilityproduce‘young’populationpyramidswithawidebase.Neither is itnews
that high life expectancy and low fertility produce ‘ageing’ pyramids that look
more like rectangles.However because both sociology and demography tend to
overlookthepowerfulrelationshipbetweenfertilityandmortalitycreatedbythe
efficiencyofthereproductivesystem,thegrowthoftheshareofoldergenerations
in the population continues to be seen as an avoidable evil,despite the fact that,
aswehave seen above,no society that has crossed the threshold ofmass survival
to old age has responded with anything other than a steep fall in fertility.
Population ‘ageing’ is a curious way to label one of the greatest modern
accomplishments of humankind: the ‘democratisation’ of the chances of enjoy-
ing a long, and lengthening lifespan, together with a reduction in the propor-
tion of that span dedicated to reproductive labour, and especially ‘wasted’
reproductive labour: an anodyne phrase for what it represents – the emanci-
pation of the vast majority of people both from their own early death or that
of one or more of their children. Compared to the ugly fate of those ‘popula-
tions’ condemned to live in states still blighted by war, famine, disease and high
child mortality, a fate all the more dreadful because readily avoidable, ‘popu-
lation ageing’ is an achievement to be heartily wished for.
The debate on population ageing (eg World Bank, 1994) largely turns upon
the assertion that longer lifespans mean an increase in the dependency ratio
between those in productive employment and those who are not.However this
oxymoronic term rests on a misleading metaphor characterising societies as
individuals. Individuals do ‘age’, bringing an eventual decline in their vital
capacities and death. Societies, or ‘populations’ cannot and do not ‘age’. The
shapeof theiragepyramidsmaychange,butageing isasocialaswellasbiological
process, and one of the key results of the increase in the social forces of
production has been an increase not just in average life expectancy, but also in
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the standardof health andactivity of people for any given calendar age.SirMick
Jagger, for example,might qualify for a bus pass, but remains a sex symbol and
active rock star at an age which, a century ago, would probably have rendered
him infirm had he been fortunate enough to survive at all. Once again, a
longitudinal view can correct a mistaken transversal impression. We cannot
determinethefuturecapacitiesoftheelderlybymakingtransversalcomparisons
acrossdifferentgenerationswithdifferentagesinthepopulationatapointintime.
Older people today are vastly different from their counterparts in earlier times
of earlier generations. So too will be the elderly of the future.
What matters in dependency ratios is the balance, over time and across
generations, between the productivity of those who work and the consumption
levels of those who do not, as well as the relative size of these two groups.The
productivity of the former will continue to increase.The consumption levels of
the latter depend inter alia on the relative costs of maintaining retired and
inactive people versus that of maintaining and educating those who have yet to
enter the labour force. Insofar as the debate about population ageing is about
concern over worsening ‘dependency ratios’ as the number of elderly inactive
increases it is simply empirically mistaken. As we have seen the elderly take
on an increasing amount of reproductive work this facilitates much higher
rates of incorporation of prime age women into the labour market, as well as
maintaining high rates of male participation despite trends towards equaliza-
tion in the domestic and childcare sexual division of labour (thus improving
rather than worsening dependency ratios). A paradoxical effect of the shift
from gender to generation in the distribution of work is therefore that actual
dependency ratios (in the sense of the relationship between those doing pro-
ductive work and those dependent on them) come to have less and less to do
with age, or the shape of age pyramids in a given society.
Yet perhaps more important than these effects, is the lack of any simple
relationship between dependency and employment status. Young employees
may carry heavy burdens of training or mortgage debt. The retired may
possess substantial assets accumulated across the life course. And if we learn
the key lesson of not drawing longitudinal conclusions from transversal com-
parisons, we may safely hypothesise that tomorrow’s retirees will have accu-
mulated more than today’s. Once again we may take Spain as an example,
where calculations taking an appropriately longitudinal perspective reveal
a very different prospect for dependency ratios than the standard gloomy
prognoses. Analysing synthetic cohorts constructed from a quarter century
of Labour Force Surveys, Garrido Medina and Chuliá Rodrigo estimate that
dependency ratios in Spain will fall 40% between 1985 and 2030 (2005 figure
6.2). Blanes et al. (1996), also using longitudinal techniques, obtained similar
results a decade earlier. Advancing activity rates for women and the fall in
young dependents more than make up for the rise in the number of older
inactive people and later labour market entry.
There is a well known strong statistical relationship between a state’s afflu-
ence and the life expectancy of its citizens. Affluence has been assumed to
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confer longevity. However the reverse is also important: mass longevity facili-
tates affluence. How can it be, therefore, that such magnificent social progress
comes to been seen as the social sclerosis summoned up by ‘population ageing’
rhetoric? Let us outline two hypotheses. First such rhetoric is a convenient tool
for those seeking rationales to restrict the welfare state, on the grounds that
such sclerosis threatens future prosperity. Second, it comprises an unfortunate
legacy from social sciences’ flirtation with eugenicist ideas (Mackenzie, 1981).
From Malthus onwards demography has at times been distorted by an unfor-
tunate tendency to see the right kind of early deaths as, in the long run, not
only inevitable but even desirable.
The rise of identity
Only in a world where people assume that reaching one’s seventieth or eighti-
eth year in robust health is normal can it make sense to discuss the provenance
of threats to such an achievement in terms of ‘risk’. The reproductive revolu-
tion has thus facilitated what has been theorized as the rise of reflexivity or
self-identity (Giddens, 1991). Material affluence and demographic security
simultaneously multiply the range of opportunities available to both men and
women, or what Dahrendorf (1979) called ‘life chances’, while raising their
opportunity costs. While it increases people’s ability in principle to ‘plan’
across what can be expected to be a much longer life course, rather than
resigning themselves to superstition, magic or faith, the mobile, disorientating,
extensive and complex nature of this demographically more secure society
nevertheless supplies new terrors aplenty to besiege people’s sense of existen-
tial security (Gellner, 1993: 31–5). Thus, for us, the contrasts made between
‘risk’ and ‘fate’ by theorists, such as Beck,Giddens or Lash, turn things on their
head.They present what is experienced by most people as liberation from the
fatal consequences of ignorance, disorder and want, as the socially constructed
domination of people’s lives by necessarily opaque scientific expertise and
specialization (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994; Giddens, 1991).
The visibility of the reproductive revolution
It might be asked why, if it is so fundamental, the reproductive revolution has
gone unrecognised. There are many answers, but let us highlight a method-
ological one and a substantive one. Sociology (and often demography) prefers
transversal (cross-sectional) measures and analyses, particularly where imme-
diate policy relevance is sought. However, since such measures inevitably
combine the experience of successive generations, which come to appear as
characteristics of different age groups at a given point in time, they obscure
processes involved in the reproduction of society over time. Instead of repre-
senting tremendous social progress, low fertility and mortality come to appear
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respectively as a deficit of births and surfeit of dependent elderly. By contrast
the reproductive revolution, mass maturity and reproduction of society over
time are only clearly visible using longitudinal measures. This problem is
aggravated by the tendency to imagine societies (plural) as essentially discrete,
two-dimensional structures5 whose essential characteristics may be captured
by the social survey or census, and which change over time as they move up or
down history as coherent units (Anderson, 1991: 33). On the contrary we wish
to emphasise the significance of mortal biographies and generational and life
course change within a human society that spills across both state frontiers and
time periods.
The second reason is that the nature of the reproductive revolution itself
tends to render its results less visible. Not only is it an unplanned and uncon-
scious process at the social level (although the individual level may be a very
different matter); the material affluence and increased individual autonomy it
helps to create minimises its visibility by presenting reproductive behaviour
that was formerly a virtually unavoidable collective obligation as a matter of
apparently onerous personal choice. This yields the paradoxical result that is
key to any adequate understanding of current fertility trends in affluent soci-
eties. Just at that point in human history where the efficiency of sexual repro-
duction has been revolutionised, and the social controls on sexuality have all
but disappeared, it comes to appear as something that has become so much
more costly that it is only possible to maintain at all if an ever greater share
of its burden is assumed by the state. The essence of this paradox is that the
victory of the reproductive revolution becomes so absolute that it falls prey to
social amnesia. Only societies whose reproduction is assured can afford the
luxury of thinking in terms of the ‘opportunity costs’ of children, or indeed any
substantial personal input to reproductive decision-making at all.
Conclusions
We are clearly making a bold claim when we argue that reproductive change
has not only been revolutionary, but of such overarching significance as to
compare with the other two, generally acknowledged, revolutions fundamen-
tal to the rise of modern society (Hobsbawm, 1962). However, this demo-
graphic change can be seen neither as a ‘cause’ nor ‘effect’ of other,
analytically distinct, social change. Only by appreciating the interconnected
nature of change within the demographic and other arenas can the rise of
modernity be understood. Moreover, in developing what might be thought of
as a sociology of reproduction, we do not mean a sociology of the social
context within which reproduction (understood in terms of other dynamics)
takes place. On the contrary, it is part of our argument that the failure to take
sufficient account of the sexual genesis of human beings, and therefore of the
social significance of the unique demographic change represented by the re-
productive revolution, has been a key theoretical weakness of contemporary
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sociology in contrast to the interest Davis originally pursued. His focus on
reproductive institutions is a useful corrective to ‘over-socialised’ approaches
to individuals (Wrong, 1961).
This article has suggested a new concept for understanding the nature of
demographic change in modern societies, arguing that adopting a longitudi-
nal rather than transversal perspective reveals the existence of a one-off
change in the efficiency of the reproductive system (considered in its sim-
plest form as the relation of the number of births per woman to population
level) which has been fundamental to the rise of modernity. It has argued
that recognising this has profound implications for how we view such issues
as declining fertility, population ageing, the evolution of the family, the role
of the state, gender change and the distribution of work (both productive
and reproductive, paid and unpaid) across the life course and between men
and women. We believe it also has an important role to play in many other
debates, such as the progressive deregulation of sexuality (including the
legalisation of homosexual marriage); the sociology of age and the life
course; the evolution of the intergenerational transfer of wealth and other
forms of capital (and the competition between the state and the family to
control it); the economics of time and that whole tradition of sociology that
seeks to establish links between modernisation, broadly conceived, seculari-
sation and changing values.
Enduring revolutions are about change that is not only rapid but popular,
not only because it affects the mass of the population, but because they are its
protagonists. Rather, people have found ways to emancipate themselves from
the demographic straitjacket of the past, discovering in turn, that such eman-
cipation opens up for them hitherto unimagined freedom of manoeuvre in
their lives, including the freedom to devote more time and resources to the
rearing of their children within a much longer lifespan, or, alternatively, the
freedom to delay becoming a parent till an age they would in earlier centuries
have been lucky to survive to, or again to avoid becoming a parent at all. In
affluent states life may still be solitary, poor, nasty or brutish at times, but it is
very rarely short.
The reproductive revolution is also a global one. Unfortunately, the geo-
politics of demography has at times tended to focus concern on lowering
fertility in the developing world rather than tackling mortality.While affluent
states express widespread concern about their ‘low’ fertility and population
ageing, much of the world’s population still lives in states where infant mor-
tality is above levels that European states left behind a century ago, and the
AIDS epidemic has reversed the slow rise of life expectancy in sub-Saharan
Africa.At a global level, there is no shortage of births. Because the reproduc-
tive revolution remains incomplete, there is still an awful, and avoidable,
surfeit of early deaths.
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Notes
1 Authors’ analysis, Centre for Longitudinal Studies (2004). This understates the demographic
change in that a proportion of grandparents are alive but not definitely known to be so by their
children.
2 Authors’ analysis Central Intelligence Agency (2008), using July 2007 population estimates.
3 Authors’ analysis International Social Survey Programme (2004) and Jowell, R and the Central
Co-ordinating Team (2005).
4 Authors’ analysis Centre for Longitudinal Studies (2004).
5 Visualised, for example, in terms of a dataset or as members of a ‘population’ distributed along
the x-axis and their various characteristics plotted on a series of Y-axes.
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